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Carbon regulation is intended to reduce global emissions, but there is growing concern that such regulation
may simply shift production to unregulated regions, potentially increasing overall carbon emissions in the
process. Carbon taris have emerged as a possible mechanism to address this concern by imposing carbon
costs on imports at the regulated region's border. Advocates claim that such a mechanism would level the
playing eld whereas opponents argue that such a tari is anti-competitive. This paper analyzes how carbon
taris aect technology choice, regional competitiveness, and global emissions through a model of imperfect
competition between \domestic" (i.e., carbon-regulated) rms and \foreign" (i.e., unregulated) rms, where
domestic rms have the option to oshore production and the number of foreign entrants is endogenous.
Under a carbon tari, results indicate that foreign rms would adopt clean technology at a lower emissions
price than domestic producers, with the number of foreign entrants increasing in emissions price only over
intervals where foreign rms hold this technology advantage. Further, domestic rms would only oshore
production under a carbon tari to adopt technology strictly cleaner than technology utilized domestically.
As a consequence, under a carbon tari, foreign market share is non-monotonic in emissions price, and global
emissions conditionally decrease. Without a carbon tari, foreign share monotonically increases in emissions
price, and a shift to oshore production results in a strict increase in global emissions.
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1. Introduction
Under emissions regulation such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS)
and California's pending Assembly Bill 32 (AB32), imports entering the region fall outside the
regulatory regime and incur no carbon costs. With carbon regulation driving projected production
cost increases in excess of 40% within some industries, this asymmetry endows production facili-
ties located outside the regulated region with a windfall cost advantage, signicantly altering the
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competitive landscape.
This cost advantage provides competitors outside the regulated region (i.e., \foreign" rms) with
the opportunity to increase penetration into the regulated (i.e., \domestic") region, increasing
penetration in sectors where they already compete, and potentially entering sectors where transport
costs have prohibited a signicant foreign presence (e.g., cement and steel in Europe). Further,
the comparative economics resulting from this regulatory asymmetry can lead rms with domestic
production to shift their facilities oshore in order to avoid carbon-related costs. Foreign entry and
oshoring are both sources of carbon leakage { the shift of domestic production, and associated
carbon impacts, to oshore locations as a result of emissions abatement policy. As a consequence
of carbon leakage, whole industries may potentially be ushed from the regulated region. As stated
by the Chairman of the third largest cement producer in the world, \The cost advantages of
China would almost double as a result of CO2 expense, making competitive domestic production
in Europe no longer an option" (HeidelbergCement 2008).
Carbon leakage could potentially be mitigated by border adjustments, taris on the carbon con-
tent of imported goods that would incur carbon-costs if produced domestically. Proponents of
border adjustments argue that such a measure would level the playing eld by treating domestic
and oshore production equivalently. Opponents argue that border adjustments impose a trade bar-
rier and are anti-competitive. Within Europe, EU member states would have to vote unanimously
to add a border adjustment to the EU-ETS, and both Britain and the Netherlands have publicly
opposed such a measure. Within the US, the Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454, 2009) passed suc-
cessfully through the House of Representatives and included a border adjustment. However, while
praising the proposed legislation as a whole, President Obama criticized the border adjustment,
stating that \we have to be very careful about sending any protectionist signals" (Broder 2009).
Given the ongoing debate related to the implementation of border adjustments, the present paper
explores the impact of this policy choice on technology adoption and regional competitiveness.
The impact of carbon regulation with and without border adjustments is analyzed through a
model of Cournot competition between a set of \domestic" rms established within the regulatedDavid Drake: Carbon Tari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region and an endogenous number of \foreign" rms entering the regulated region. Note that, in
the case of local regulation, such as emissions regulation within California under AB32, \foreign"
competitors would include rms in neighboring states who choose to compete in the emissions-
regulated California market. Each rm competes for the domestic market by choosing production
levels from a common set of technologies that vary in their emissions intensity and production
and capital recovery costs. Domestic production incurs carbon costs dependent on the emissions
intensity of the chosen technology, with domestic rms possessing the option to oshore production
to avoid these costs. Imports to the domestic region incur a transport cost, with foreign rms also
incurring a xed entry cost.
To facilitate analysis, I dene three sets of emissions price thresholds { thresholds for the adop-
tion of cleaner technologies, foreign entry, and oshoring. Results indicate that, under a border
adjustment, foreign rms' technology choice is more sensitive to domestic emissions regulation than
domestic technology choice: when exposed to the same cost per unit of emissions, oshore produc-
tion adopts cleaner technology at a lower emissions price than domestic production. This contrasts
the setting without border adjustment where foreign rms' technology choice is insensitive to emis-
sions price. Further, foreign entry is shown to increase monotonically in emissions price when there
is no border adjustment. However, with border adjustments in place, entry increases conditionally
over emissions price intervals where foreign rms utilize cleaner technology than domestic rms
and strictly decreases in emissions price under a border adjustment when domestic and foreign
rms operate identical technologies. This latter result lends credence to the argument that border
adjustments could potentially prove anti-competitive. Further, without border adjustments, global
emissions are shown to strictly increase as a result of leakage while global emissions conditionally
decrease due to leakage when border adjustments are in place, providing an argument for border
adjustment proponents.
The following section reviews literature related to the issues of regulatory asymmetry and border
adjustment. Section 3 develops the model and solves for equilibrium quantities, prots, and emis-
sions. Sections 4 and 5 explore technology choice, foreign entry, oshoring and resulting productionDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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decisions without and with border adjustment, respectively, and analyzes the consequences for
global emissions. Implications and promising directions for future work are discussed in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
Academics have weighed in on the issue of carbon leakage and border adjustment within the
elds of Public Policy and Economics. Within the Policy literature, leakage is largely taken as
a foregone outcome of the current plans for the EU-ETS post-2012, when the free allocation of
emissions allowances is set to expire (e.g., van Asselt and Brewer 2010; Kuik and Hofkes 2010;
Monjon and Quirion 2010). Therefore, one of the key issues within the Policy literature relates to
the legality of border adjustments as a leakage-mitigating mechanism considering WTO and the
General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) law (e.g., Grubb and Neuho 2006; van Asselt
and Biermann 2007; de Cendra 2006). Most conclude that border adjustments are conditionally
legal, but as yet untested before a WTO panel, with the principle condition for legality being the
elimination of the free allocation of allowances (Grubb and Neuho 2006; de Cendra 2006). Others
conclude that border adjustments may only be legal under WTO and GATT law for inputs directly
incorporated into nished goods (e.g., clinker into cement), but legality is less likely for inputs,
such as energy, that are not incorporated into the nished product (Biermann and Brohm 2005;
van Asselt and Biermann 2007). In terms of border adjustment design, Grubb and Neuho (2006)
propose a symmetric tari so that imports would incur the same carbon cost that they would
have incurred had they been produced domestically. Ismer and Neuho (2007), on the other hand,
propose a sector-specic at carbon cost based on the emissions intensity of the \best available
technology" { i.e., a cost independent of the technology used to produce the import. The present
paper accommodates both of these proposed border adjustment regimes.
Also within the Policy literature, Demailly and Quirion (2006) simulate the impact of cap-and-
trade emissions allowance allocation methods on the EU cement sector to determine leakage eects.
Similarly, Ponssard and Walker (2008) numerically estimate leakage within EU cement under full
cap-and-trade allowance auctioning. While both Demailly and Quirion (2006) and Ponssard andDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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Walker (2008) are based on Cournot competition (the method employed in the present paper),
neither addresses the issues of border adjustment, technology choice or the potential for EU rms
to oshore production. Lockwood and Whaley (2010) note that, within the Policy literature, the
border adjustment debate has centered primarily on the legality issues related to WTO and GATT,
with little work focusing on its impact.
Technology innovation and adoption in response to environmental regulation has been a focal
interest within the Environmental Economics literature, with Jae et al. (2002) and Popp, et al.
(2008) providing thorough reviews. However, the studies reviewed and the majority of the technol-
ogy innovation and adoption literature in Environmental Economics do not address issues related to
carbon leakage and border adjustment, which are of primary interest here. Requate (2006) provides
a review of literature pertaining to environmental policy under imperfect competition with the
vast majority of the studies considering homogenously regulated rms without technology choice.
Of the exceptions, Bayindir-Upmann (2004) considers imperfect competition under asymmetric
emissions regulation (and a labor tax) between a set of regulated rms and a set of unregulated
rms, but does not consider border adjustment or technology choice.
Within the Economics literature that studies carbon leakage, most focuses on leakage due only
to foreign entry (e.g., Di Maria and van der Werf 2008; Fowlie 2009). Di Maria and van der Werf
study leakage through an analytical model of imperfect competition between two asymmetrically
regulated regions, showing that the regulated region's ability to change technology attenuates
leakage eects. Fowlie (2009) studies leakage under imperfect competition when rms operate
dierent but exogenous technologies and then simulates California's electricity sector, nding that
leakage eliminates two-thirds of the emissions reduction that could be obtained by a uniform policy.
Babiker (2005) considers leakage in terms of both entry and oshoring in a numerical study of
imperfect competition, aggregating bilateral trade data into regions and commodity groups, nding
that asymmetric emissions regulation increases global emissions by 30% as a result of leakage. Of
these studies, none consider border adjustments or endogenize the number of foreign entrants inDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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conjunction with their focus on leakage, and only Di Maria and van der Werf (2006) allow for
technology choice.
The study of emissions regulation in general is far more nascent within Operations Management
(OM), without any work related to leakage and border adjustment to the author's knowledge. Krass
et al. (2010) and Drake et al. (2010) both consider technology choice under emissions regulation in
non-competitive settings. Zhao et al. (2010) explores the impact of allowance allocation schemes
on technology choice in electric power markets, assuming a xed number of competitors and that
all rms operate in a single region and face the same regulatory environment (i.e., no leakage).
Islegen and Reichstein (2009) also study technology choice in a competitive sector under emissions
regulation, exploring break-even points for the adoption of carbon capture and storage in power
generation. However, foreign entry, oshoring and asymmetric emissions regulation, which are of
primary interest in the present paper, are not considered (or pertinent) in their context.
Within the general OM literature, Cournot competition has been widely used as a foundation
to study various competitive environments. It has been used to study competitive investment in
exible technologies (e.g., R oller and Tombak 1993; Goyal and Netessine 2007), competition when
rms are able to share asymmetric information (e.g., Li 2002; Ha and Tong 2008), competition
across multi-echelon supply chains (e.g., Carr and Karmarker 2005; Ha et al. 2011), and competition
within specic markets such as the energy sector (e.g., Hobbs and Pang 2007) and the inuenza
vaccine market (Deo and Corbett 2009). The present paper employs Cournot competition to study
the impact of asymmetric emissions regulation with and without border adjustment when rms'
technology choices and the number of foreign entrants are endogenous.
This paper contributes to the OM literature by introducing the issues of border adjustment and
carbon leakage. As the analysis that ensues makes evident, border adjustments (or lack thereof)
play a vital role in determining rms' technology and production choices, both of which are funda-
mental OM decisions that ultimately determine economic and environmental performance. Border
adjustments also play a pivotal role in determining the nature of regional competitiveness and
the potential for carbon leakage, which represents an emerging and important cause of oshoring.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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The paper also contributes to the general literature by studying the impact of border adjustment
policy when rms choose production technologies. This represents a critical contribution as results
here illustrate that the border adjustment policy decision and rms' technology choices interact to
fundamentally determine the nature of regional competitiveness, the risk of carbon leakage, and
the potential for carbon regulation to achieve a reduction in global emissions. As such, this paper
raises important implications related to the role and feasibility of border adjustments in mitigating
leakage eects that can result from current, uncoordinated emissions abatement eorts.
3. Competition under a Regionally Asymmetric Emissions Regulation
Under current emissions regulation, domestic production incurs emissions costs while oshore pro-
duction does not. As a result, imports can compete within the carbon-regulated region with a
new-found advantage. Such asymmetric regulation has the potential to alter the competitive bal-
ance between domestic and foreign rms. All proofs are provided in Appendix 1.
3.1. Model development
A regulator imposes an emissions price " for each unit of emissions generated through domestic
production. Within this environment, a set of domestic rms Nd =f1;:::;ndg engages in Cournot
competition with a of set foreign rms No = f0;:::;nog1. Each domestic rm i 2 Nd can choose
their production location, l 2 L = fd;og, where d indicates domestic production and o indicates
oshore production. In other words, rms with established domestic production (i.e., those rms
belonging to Nd) can continue to operate within the domestic region or choose to oshore. However,
each potential foreign entrant j 2 No can only choose to produce oshore. This assumes that the
domestic market is mature prior to the implementation of emissions regulation, which is the case
for emissions regulated sectors { e.g., cement, steel, glass, pulp and paper.
Foreign rms can choose to enter and compete in the domestic market, but only if they can
earn an operating prot of at least F >0, where F represents a xed entry cost { e.g., investment
in distribution infrastructure and customer acquisition. Alternatively, F can be thought of as the
1 As Fowlie (2009) points out, empirical work suggests that rm behavior in emissions-intensive industries comports
with static, oligopolistic competition in quantities.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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minimum operating prot required to motivate a foreign rm to enter the domestic market. The
rms that enter also incur transport cost  >0 for each unit imported into the domestic market.
Both domestic and foreign rms develop capacities by choosing from a common set of production
technologies K = f1;:::;mg, with k > 0 representing the unit production and capital recovery
cost of the kth technology and k  0 representing the kth technology's emissions intensity (i.e.,
emissions per unit of production), where k 2K. Oshore production generates an additional  >0
emissions per unit through transport. Further, foreign rms incur a per unit border adjustment cost
of k  0 (with k = 0; 8k representing the case with no border adjustment implemented). These
border adjustment costs are general here, but will be characterized as symmetric in Section 5. A
discount factor  2(0;1) represents the dierence in production and capital recovery cost between
oshore and domestic regions (due to dierences in labor and other input costs), which is assumed
to be less than 1 in regions where oshore production would be attractive. Therefore, the per unit
landed cost of technology k operated in location l is
ck;l(";)=
(
k +k" if l =d
k + +k if l =o:
Table 1 summarizes set notation while Table 2 summarizes cost and emissions parameters.
Index Set Elements
i= domestic competitor Nd f1;:::;ndg
j = foreign competitor No f1;:::;nog
k = production technology K f1;:::;mg
l = production location L d= domestic
o= oshore
Table 1 Indices, sets and elements for competitors, locations and technologies.
Among domestic competitors, rm i chooses quantities xi;k;l for each technology k and loca-




k=1xi;k;d. Total production o-




k=1xi;k;o. Among foreign competi-




k=1yj;k. The market is assumed to clear at price P (Xd;Xo;Y )=A b(Xd +Xo +Y ) with
A>mink2Kck;l(";) to avoid the trivial case where no competitor produces, and b>0.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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Parameter Description
" Price per unit of emissions
 Transport cost per nished good unit
k Border adjustment cost per nished good unit for technology k 2K
F Fixed entry cost (e.g, distribution infrastructure, customer acquisition)
k Per unit production and capital recovery cost of technology k 2K
k Emissions intensity of technology k 2K
 Emissions intensity of transport
 Discount factor for oshore production
ck;l(";k) Total per unit cost of technology k 2K from location l 2L
Table 2 Cost and emissions parameters.
Objectives and metrics Firms choose quantities to maximize prots while anticipating competi-










P (Xd;Xo;Y )xi;k;l  ck;l(";k)xi;k;l
i
; 8i2Nd (1)
s:t: xi;k;l 0; 8i2Nd; k 2K; l 2L;
while foreign competitor j solves
max
yj;k;8k





P (Xd;Xo;Y )yj;k  ck;o(";k)yj;k
i
;8j 2No (2)
s:t: yj;k 0; 8j 2No; k 2K:
The Kyoto Protocol was intended to abate emissions at the global level to combat the suspected



















Since ratifying nations are obligated to meet agreed-upon Kyoto reductions or face nancial con-
sequences, the regulator of the domestic region may also be concerned with its regional emissions.
The rst term in (3) characterizes domestic emissions, and will be indicated throughout.
Let domestic rm i's preferred technology be represented by k












Further, let foreign rm j's preferred technology be represented by k
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Equations (4) and (5) capture the following: domestic rms can produce locally or choose to
relocate oshore. Of their 2m possibilities, domestic rms will utilize the technology/location pair
with the lowest cost. The foreign rm, on the other hand, does not have the option to produce
domestically. Therefore, foreign rms choose the lowest cost technology from among their m possi-
bilities. It is important to note that the lowest cost domestic technology may dier from the lowest
cost oshore technology. Since technology preference is symmetric for all domestic rms, and sim-
ilarly symmetric for all foreign rms, I drop the i and j notation. Lastly, only feasible technologies
are included in K { i.e., each technology is preferred at some emissions price.





















, and r =o otherwise. Within the remainder of the paper, production and capital recov-
ery costs, emissions intensity and the border adjustment costs of the domestic rms' preferred
technology/location pair are noted as ^ d("), ^ d(") and ^ d("), respectively. Similarly, the produc-
tion and capital recovery cost, emissions intensity and border adjustment of foreign rms' preferred
technology are noted as ^ o("), ^ o(") and ^ o("). Each of these parameters depends on emissions
price as the preferred technology varies in ". However, for the sake of brevity, this dependency will
be excluded from future notation where it is clear.
3.2. Number of foreign entrants
Within the emissions regulated setting, the number of foreign rms entering the domestic market
will depend on the number of domestic competitors already established within the market, their cost
structure and market parameters. Therefore a method similar to that employed by Deo and Corbett
(2009) is used to endogenize the number of foreign entrants. Foreign rms compete operating




The following proposition characterizes the number of foreign entrants.David Drake: Carbon Tari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The number of foreign rms that choose to compete within the domestic market increases in the
market size, A, and decreases in the foreign competitors' total landed cost, ^ ck
o() and the number of







Dening N = nd +n
o as the number of total rms competing at equilibrium and assuming n
o >
0, then N is independent of nd when domestic rms have oshored production. Under such
conditions, an increase in nd is oset by an equivalent decrease in n
o, so that the total number of
competitors remains unchanged. Therefore, when domestic rms produce oshore and n
o >0, the
total number of rms competing within the domestic market depends only on the cost structure
of foreign rms, ^ ck
o () and F, and market parameters A and b.







Fb . Note that the equilibrium number of competitors will decrease with the addition




Fb. Further, assuming no border adjustment (i.e., k = 0)
and domestic production as the lowest cost option, then ^ ck
o ()   ^ ck
d () decreases in " by nd^ d.
As a consequence, the number of foreign rms competing within the domestic market increases in
emissions price at a rate equivalent to
nd^ d p
Fb . This is the scenario currently playing out within the
European cement industry. Historically, signicant transport costs led to large total landed costs
for foreign competitors relative to domestic rms { i.e., ^ ck
o () signicantly greater than ^ ck
d (). This
limited entry by foreign competitors into the European cement market to less than 5% of total
sales. However, with emissions costs under the EU-ETS dominating those transport costs, 95% of
the European cement capacity added since 2004 is represented by nishing facilities located near
ports { i.e., capacity added by rms preparing to import into the region.
As implied by Proposition 1, there are conditions when no foreign competitors enter, and con-
ditions when they do. I consider the latter case here and the former in subsection 3.4.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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3.3. Firm decisions and performance with foreign entry
The following proposition describes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when foreign rms enter the
domestic market:

















































=0; 8k 2K; 8i2Nd;




















o; 8j 2No: (8)
The joint concavity of domestic and foreign rm objectives (Equations 1 and 2) is provided within
Appendix 1.
Given that the number of foreign competitors is endogenized here, it is not surprising that the
equilibrium quantities in Proposition 2 no longer depend on no. More surprising is that these
quantities also no longer depend on the number of domestic competitors, nd, despite potential
dierences in oshore and domestic production economics. This is due to N being xed when







rms produce locally. It is also clear from a casual comparison of (7) and (8) that domestic rm
production is strictly greater than foreign rm production when their lowest cost option is local,
and that production is equivalent when they oshore in equilibrium.
Market and performance metrics follow directly from the equilibrium quantities indicated by






: At this equilibrium price,
rm's earn
p
Fb greater than the marginal producer's cost. This results in foreign rm operating
prots of 
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If domestic rms' best option is to produce locally, then prot increases in the domestic rms'
total landed cost advantage. However, if domestic rms' lowest cost option is to oshore, then they
each earn a prot equivalent to foreign rms' cost to enter the domestic market (or reservation
prot), F. When oshoring, domestic rms become symmetric to foreign rms in both quantities
and prot, with their only remaining advantage being a reserved place in the market as incumbents.
Further, foreign entry as characterized by (6) along with production at the equilibrium quantities
















































When domestic rms opt to produce locally (i.e., where r =d), the rst term characterizes domestic
emissions. Assuming n
o >0, then an incremental increase in " to the point at which domestic rms
shift production oshore leads to a change in global emissions. Dene "o as the point where domestic






[^ o("o)+   ^ d("o  )]. This dierence is the equilibrium quantity produced by the
nd domestic rms once they oshore, as given by (7) when ^ ck
d ()= ^ ck
d (), multiplied by the relative
change in emissions intensity. As will be shown, without a border adjustment, this dierence is
strictly positive, while with a border adjustment it is conditionally negative.
3.4. Firms decisions and performance without foreign entry
When foreign competitors opt not to enter { i.e., under endogenous non-entry { equilibrium quan-
tities are described by the following corollary.









Fb(nd + 1)  A, a domestic oligopoly results.
Oshore competitors do not compete in the domestic marketplace and domestic competitors produce
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Such a scenario results in the well-known Cournot oligopoly market price and rm prots of
P
























2 ; 8i2Nd; (12)
respectively.
Similarly, global emissions under this scenario equate to total output under a traditional Cournot
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4. Firm Decisions and Performance without Border Adjustment
Emissions regulation in eect today is not currently supported by border adjustment mechanisms.
This allows goods produced oshore to compete within the domestic market without incurring
the carbon costs associated with local production. While implementing a border adjustment may
appear to be a straight-forward solution to this asymmetry, the potential for such a measure to be
interpreted as a trade barrier, and thereby initiate a reciprocal tari, has thus far stymied debate
on the issue. As a consequence, emissions cost asymmetry of goods sold within the domestic market
may persist indenitely. I explore that setting here2, with k =0, 8k 2K.
Order all technologies from dirtiest to cleanest and assume non-zero emissions so that k >
k0 > 0, 8k < k0 2 K. Given this ordering, note that Assumption 1 implies that production cost
increases in type, k < k0;8k < k0 2 K. If a type were dominated in both cost and environmental
impact, it would be infeasible and dropped from the choice set. Then make the following additional
assumption:
2 This section also structurally supports a at carbon tari such as one based on the best available technology as
proposed by Ismer and Nueho (2007). A at carbon tari is independent of the technology that imports are produced
with, and therefore does not incent technology change among foreign rms. Such a tari could be incorporated within
the transport cost, , with the results of this section holding.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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Assumption 2. The domestic production cost of the dirtiest technology is less than the transport
plus oshore production cost of the dirtiest technology, 1 <1 +.
This second assumption ensures that domestic rms will prefer to produce locally when emissions
are unregulated, i.e., c1;d(0;0) < c1;o(0;0). While this assumption will obviously not hold for all
sectors in the general economy, it is reasonable for carbon-regulated sectors. Domestic carbon
regulation would be unnecessary in sectors where such an assumption does not hold, as production
would oshore even when carbon costs are zero. Without such an assumption, there would be no
domestic production to regulate.
4.1. Emissions price thresholds
Three classes of emissions price thresholds are of interest: the emissions prices that lead to a change
in technology choice; that result in foreign entry; and that lead to the oshoring of domestic pro-
duction. Without a border adjustment, foreign rms always choose technology 1 to serve domestic
demand as 1 <k, 8k >2K and oshore production is not exposed to carbon costs. Therefore,
production costs are insensitive to " and no emissions threshold leads to the adoption of cleaner
technology by foreign rms. For domestic rms, dene "d
k =
k k 1
k 1 k as the lowest emissions price
at which domestic production with technology k is preferred over domestic production with tech-
nology k   1. Assumption 1 implies that technology k is the domestic rm preferred technology
at emissions price "d
k { i.e., k  k0 2 Knk when " 2 ["d
k;"d
k+1). Without a border adjustment, the
regulator's ability to induce domestic rms to adopt technology k >1 through emissions price can
be limited.
Remark 1. Without a border adjustment, technology k >1 will not be adopted at any emissions
price if  <k  1 +k"d
k; 8k 2f2;:::;mg.
In this setting, oshoring with technology 1 would be preferred to using technology k domestically
if c1;o("d
k;0) < ck;d("d
k;0);8 k0 < k 2 K, with this inequality leading to the condition in Remark 1.
In sectors where this holds, domestic rms would prefer to oshore production than switch to
cleaner domestic technology k. Dene "o =
1+ ^ d
^ d as the minimum emissions price at whichDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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nd^ d as the minimum emissions price at which foreign rms enter the domestic
market without a border adjustment.
4.2. Equilibrium quantities













. Then, in light of the above thresholds,
Propositions 1 and 2 imply the following:
Proposition 3. Assume k =0, 8k 2K. Total output is xed in " when ""e.
As previously noted in the discussion of Proposition 1, the number of foreign entrants increases
in emissions price at a rate of
nd^ d p




b , so total production by foreign rms increases at a rate of
nd^ d
b in emissions price. It
is also clear from Proposition 2 that the total rate of change in production among domestic rms






b . Therefore, total output is inelastic in emissions
price after foreign entry, with increases resulting from incremental entry balanced by domestic
production decreases. While total output remains inelastic in emissions price, note that domestic
share decreases and total foreign share increases in emissions price until domestic rms opt to
oshore production. This result is robust to shifts in domestic technology, holding even if domestic
and oshore production utilize dierent technologies. Shifting to a cleaner technology reduces the
rate of share change in " between domestic and foreign rms' production (by reducing ^ d), but
total output remains xed with respect to emissions price. Consistent with this result, Bayindir-
Upmann (2004) also nds that an increase in emissions price leads to increased foreign entry while
total output remains constant. Proposition 2 therefore generalizes that nding to settings with
technology choice.
Corollary 2. Assume k =0, 8k 2K. Equilibrium quantities are xed in " when ""o.
This comports well with intuition; without a border adjustment, changes in domestic emissions
prices have no impact on oshore production. With no border adjustment, n
o no longer dependsDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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on emissions price when domestic rms oshore production { i.e., when ^ ck
d() = ^ ck
o(), as evident
in Proposition 1. Likewise, from Proposition 2, domestic equilibrium quantities x
i;k
d;r() are no
longer dependent on emissions price when ^ ck
d() = ^ ck
o(). This implies not only that total output
is independent of " (as in Proposition 3), but that both foreign rm production and domestic
rm production decisions are inelastic in " when ">"o. Note also that Corollary 2 implies that if
"e >"o, then foreign rms will not enter at any emissions price.
If emissions price is less than the threshold that results in the oshoring of domestic production,
and less than the threshold that results in foreign entry, then rms operate in a domestic oligopoly
with local production. In such a setting, it is clear from Corollary 1 that domestic quantities
decrease in emissions price. It is also clear from the discussion of Proposition 3 that domestic
quantities decrease in the interval ["e;"o), while the number of foreign entrants strictly increases
over the same interval. Without a border adjustment, this implies the following:
Remark 2. Assume k = 0, 8k 2 K. Domestic quantities strictly decrease in " for any " < "o,
while foreign entry strictly increases in " when "2["e;"o).
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Figure 1 Illustrative examples of equilibrium quantities sensitivity to emissions price without border adjustment.
Within Figure 1a, a domestic oligopoly exists over the interval  1, with production decreasing
in ". At point "e, entry conditions are satised. Therefore, foreign entry increases in " over  2 per
Remark 2, while domestic quantities decrease. Point "o indicates the oshoring threshold, beyondDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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which both domestic- and foreign-owned capacity operate outside the regulated region and are
xed in " per Corollary 2. Figure 1b is similar except the production and capital recovery cost of
technology 2 has been decreased to allow for its adoption, which occurs at point "d
2. The reduced
emissions intensity of type 2 technology decreases the domestic rms' exposure to emissions price,
which reduces the rate at which domestic production decreases in intervals 
2 and 
3, and decreases
the rate at which foreign rms enter over 
3. Per Proposition 3, total output is constant in " over

3 as market share shifts toward foreign rms.
4.3. Emissions performance
As a consequence of Corollary 2, the regulator possesses a limited ability to impact global emissions
when there is no border adjustment. Increasing emissions price beyond "o yields no further emissions
reduction as such increases have no impact on oshore technology or quantity decisions. Further,
a shift of domestic production oshore as a result of " > "o leads to a strict increase in emissions
intensity; domestic rms utilize the dirtiest technology when producing oshore and generate 
in transport emissions by importing into the domestic region.
Remark 3. Assume k = 0, 8k 2 K. Global emissions strictly increase as a result of carbon
leakage due to oshoring.
Carbon leakage due to foreign entry results from increases in emissions price when domestic
rms produce locally and the entry condition given in Proposition 2 is met. Although total output
remains inelastic to emissions price in such a setting, it is clear from Proposition 3 that production
shifts oshore as a consequence of increased foreign entry as " increases within the interval ["e;"o).
Given that total production remains unchanged (by Proposition 3), when leakage due to entry
occurs, it results in a strict increase in global emissions relative to the displaced domestic production
as ^ d  ^ o =1, and  >0. This is formalized with the following remark:
Remark 4. Assume k = 0, 8k 2 K. Carbon leakage due to foreign entry increases in " when
" 2 ["e;"o), with emissions from entry strictly greater than emissions from displaced domestic
production.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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These emissions eects are illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b, but are clearly more pronounced in
Figure 2b where leakage implies a shift from cleaner domestic production (with technology 2) to
dirtier oshore production (with technology 1). While it may seem as though a regulator would
avoid setting an emissions price within intervals 
3 or 
4, they impose a single emissions price for























































































Figure 2 Illustrative examples of global emissions sensitivity to emissions price without border adjustment.
4.4. Discussion and summary
Emissions regulation without border adjustment limits the legislation's ability to impact global
emissions, eectively imposing an upper bound on its ability to impact both levels of production
and shifts to cleaner technologies. Increases in emissions price beyond "o incentivize no response
from competitors in terms of output or technology choice as all production takes place oshore,
beyond the regulatory umbrella. Therefore, if the emissions price under which domestic production
would move oshore is less than the price that would results in foreign entry (i.e., "o < "e), then
oshoring preempts such entry. Likewise, if the emissions price that motivates oshoring is less
than that which incentivizes a shift to cleaner technology k (i.e., "o <"d
k) then oshoring preempts
that technology adoption. It should be noted that the issue of an industry oshoring en masse as
a consequence of carbon costs is not purely of academic interest. Studies of the European cement
industry suggest that all production in Italy, Greece, Poland and the United Kingdom would shift
oshore at an emissions price of 25 Euro per ton of CO2 { which is less than projected emissionsDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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costs under EU-ETS Phase III { with this oshoring increasing global emissions by a minimum
estimate of 7 million tons of CO2 (Boston Consulting Group 2008).
Within settings where domestic rms produce locally (i.e., " < "o), increases in emissions price
beyond "e lead to the counter-intuitive eect of increasing global emissions despite reductions in
domestic emissions. Under such circumstances, a portion of domestic production is displaced by
more emissions intensive oshore production (accounting for transport). As a consequence, the
only interval over emissions prices where the regulator can reduce global emissions without a border
adjustment are in cases of domestic oligopoly { settings where all production is local. Even then,
such reductions imply a reduction in rm prots and consumer surplus, aside from the specic
points where the emissions price increase incentivizes technology change, i.e., at "="d
k. This clearly
poses a trade-o in terms of managing social welfare. Results in settings without border adjustment









































Impact of Emissions Price Increase Without Border Adjustment
• Dirty offshore production only (    does not 
incentivize cleaner offshore technology)
• Domestic share decreases monotonically 
(Remark 2)
• Total production fixed following entry when         
. (Proposition 3) 
• Domestic and foreign share fixed after 
offshoring at              (Corollary 2)
• Emissions strictly increase under leakage 
(Remarks 3 and 4)
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Figure 3 Entry and oshoring paths and results under increasing emissions price without border adjustment.
5. Firm Decisions and Performance with Border Adjustment
While not currently in eect today, much debate related to emissions regulation has centered on
the implementation of border adjustments. It is therefore important to understand how borderDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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adjustments impact technology choices, production decisions and ultimately performance. I con-
sider that setting here by applying identical carbon costs to domestic and oshore goods produced
with the same technology3 { i.e., imposing a border adjustment such that k = k", 8k 2 K. Note
that transport emissions  do not incur carbon costs under such a border adjustment.
5.1. Emissions price thresholds
Consider again the three classes of emissions thresholds identied in the previous subsection { the
emissions price thresholds that result in a technology shift, the threshold that results in foreign
entry, and the threshold that results in the oshoring of domestic production { which are noted




k 1 k, 8k > 1 2 K as the emissions price at which domestic preference switches







8k > 1 2 K as the emissions price at which preference for oshore production technologies does
the same. As a consequence of both domestic and foreign rms facing identical carbon costs for
a given technology, the adoption of clean technologies for oshore production diers signicantly
under a border adjustment. In the setting without a border adjustment, oshore production always
utilized the dirtiest technology to serve the domestic market. However, with a border adjustment,
foreign rms adopt clean technologies at a lower emissions price than domestic rms, up to the
point where domestic rms oshore production. Dening ko as the technology at which domestic
rms oshore, the following Lemma formally states this sensitivity:
Lemma 1. Assume k =k", 8k 2K. Conditional on entry, foreign rms adopt clean technolo-
gies at a lower emissions price than rms producing domestically, i.e., ~ "o
k < ~ "d
k, 8k 2f2;:::;kog.
Given a border adjustment and that oshore production and capital recovery costs are less than
domestic production and capital recovery costs (i.e.,  <1), foreign rms adopt clean technologies
to serve the domestic market at lower emissions prices than domestic rms up to the point where
3 Grubb and Neuho (2006) proposed such a \symmetric" border adjustment as non-discriminatory and therefore
most likely to be feasible under WTO and GATT law (given the elimination of freely-allocated emissions allowances).David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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domestic rms opt to oshore. While this result follows clearly from a comparison of ~ "d
k and ~ "o
k,
it runs counter to intuition. Under a border adjustment, the technology choices of foreign rms
importing into the domestic market are more sensitive to the domestic region's emissions regulation
than domestic producer's technology choices. Conditional upon entry, foreign rms operate cleaner
technology than locally producing domestic rms when "2[~ "o
k; ~ "d








With oshore production adopting clean technologies at lower emissions prices than domestic
production, emissions price can be suciently great to cause domestic rms to oshore. This is
counter-intuitive under a border adjustment where carbon costs are identical for domestic and
oshore production with a given technology, and when oshore production incurs transport costs.
However, under a border adjustment, oshoring always leads to the adoption of a technology that
is strictly cleaner than the technology utilized domestically, as summarized with the following
proposition:
Proposition 4. Assume k =k", 8k 2K. Domestic rms only oshore to adopt a technology
ko strictly cleaner than the technology utilized domestically.
Under border adjustment, oshore and domestic carbon costs are identical for a given technology.
As a result, the cost frontier over emissions price of preferred oshore technologies parallels that
of the preferred domestic technologies when that preferred technology is the same { i.e., when
" 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1). However, over emissions price intervals where oshore production utilizes cleaner
technology { i.e., when " 2 ["o
k;"d
k), the oshore cost frontier is less steep than the domestic cost
frontier. Therefore, it is only possible for these cost frontiers to intersect over emissions price
intervals where the preferred oshore technology is cleaner than the preferred domestic technology.
As domestic production oshores at this point of intersection, oshoring implies that the domestic
rm adopts cleaner technology than they had employed domestically. Further, oshoring is more
likely as the emissions improvement achieved through cleaner technology (i.e., k 1 k) increases.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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5.2. Equilibrium quantities
Foreign entry is non-monotonic when oshore production incurs carbon costs due to border adjust-
ment. This diers from the setting without border adjustment where entry monotonically increases
in ". As a consequence, there are potentially multiple entry thresholds under a border adjustment,
all dened by the entry condition given in Proposition 2. Entry decreases in " when foreign rms






. But entry can increase in " when
foreign rms operate cleaner technology than domestic rms, "2[~ "o
k; ~ "d
k).
Proposition 5. Assume k =k", 8k 2K. When foreign rms compete in the domestic market,
foreign entry increases in " over the interval " 2 [~ "o
k; ~ "d





otherwise strictly decreases in ".
Oshore rms utilize technology k and domestic rms produce with technology k 1 in the inter-
val [~ "o
k; ~ "d
k), for all k 2 f2;:::;kog. Following from Proposition 1, the number of entrants increases
in " within this interval at a rate of
 k+nd(k 1 k)
p
Fb , which is non-negative when
k 1
k  1 +
1
nd.
The LHS of this condition is greater than one and the RHS decreases in the number of domestic
competitors { conditional on foreign entry, more competitive domestic markets decrease the hurdle
beyond which entry will increase in ". Recall that foreign rms' production is independent of "
per Proposition 2. As a consequence, total production from foreign entrants increases when the
conditions of Proposition 5 are met. However, foreign entry decreases in " under all other condi-
tions { i.e., when the cleaner technology operated by foreign rms is not suciently clean for the
inequality to hold, or when foreign and domestic rms operate identical technology. The regions of
decrease are interesting here. They run counter to the impact of " on oshore production without a
border adjustment. Recall from discussion of Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 that, without a border
adjustment, total oshore production increases in " within the interval ["e;"o), and is inelastic in
" when " > "o. At no point does total oshore production decrease in " when there is no border
adjustment as it conditionally does with a border adjustment.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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Proposition 6. Assume k = k", 8k 2 K. Conditional on foreign entry, total domestic rm
production strictly decreases in " when "2[~ "o
k; ~ "d
k), 8k 2f2;:::;kog, but otherwise is xed in ".
This result follows directly from Lemma 1 and Proposition 2. When foreign rms operate cleaner
technology than domestic rms { i.e., when "2[~ "o
k; ~ "d
k), 8k 2f2;:::;kog { each domestic rm's equi-
librium quantity decreases in " at a rate of
k k 1
b . When foreign and domestic rms face equivalent






, 8k 2f2;:::;kog and when
" > ~ "d
ko { it is clear from Proposition 2 that domestic rm quantities x
i;k
d;r() are independent of
". This implies that the regulator will be unable to inuence domestic emissions under a border
adjustment when domestic and foreign rms choose to operate the same technology (given that
foreign rms are competing in the domestic market). This would impact the regulator's ability to
meet its emissions targets, which could prove costly if nancial penalties are involved such as under
Kyoto commitments. Note also that the inelasticity of x
i;k
d;r() in " when rms operate the same
technology diers from the setting with no border adjustment where domestic quantities decrease
in " for any "2[0;"o) as summarized by Remark 2.
Together, Propositions 5 and 6 raise another important and potentially controversial dierence
between the two border adjustment settings. Under a border adjustment mechanism, there are
regions where the regulator can shift market share in the favor of domestic rms by increasing
emissions price, which they are incapable of doing through emissions price without a border adjust-
ment. In settings where foreign rms compete in the domestic market when " = 0, this implies
that emissions regulation combined with a border adjustment can increase domestic market shares
relative to the unregulated baseline, arguably giving credence to concerns over the potential anti-
competitiveness of such a mechanism.
While total output in the setting with no border adjustment is xed in " > minf"e;"og, per
Proposition 3 and Corollary 2, with a border adjustment in place, total output strictly decreases.
Corollary 3. Assume k =k", 8k 2K. Total output strictly decreases in ".David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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When the conditions for a domestic oligopoly are met, this result follows directly from Corol-
lary 1. When domestic rms and foreign rms both compete and operate identical technologies,
Proposition 5 shows that total foreign quantities decrease in ", while Proposition 6 indicates that
domestic quantities remain xed. And nally, when foreign rms operate cleaner technology than
domestic rms, the rate of total production increase among foreign rms in " is
nd(k 1 k) k
b ,
while the rate of total domestic decrease in production is  
nd(k 1 k)
b , resulting in a rate of
decrease for total production of  
k
b . All said, this implies a reduction in total output in " under
a border adjustment, which diers from the setting with no border adjustment where total output
is xed with respect to emissions price when ">minf"e;"og.
5.3. Emissions performance
Implementing a balanced border adjustment equips the regulator with a greater ability to use
emissions price as a lever to encourage the adoption of clean technologies. Increases in emissions
price will not only lead to the adoption of cleaner technology among domestic rms (an eect noted
above to be limited without a border adjustment) but can also result in foreign rms adopting
cleaner technology to serve the domestic market. This obviously has implications for the potential
impact that emissions regulation can have on global emissions. While carbon leakage with no border
adjustment always leads to an increase in global emissions, under a balanced border adjustment
carbon leakage can result in global emissions improvement.
Proposition 7. Assume k =k", 8k 2K and "2[~ "o
k; ~ "d
k). Global emissions strictly decrease in
" as a result of increasing entry if  (k 1  k)<(k 1  k)
2 +
k(k+)
nd , 8k 2f2;:::;kog, and
increase in " otherwise.
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 5, it is evident that foreign entry with a border adjustment
can only occur over emissions price intervals where foreign rms operate cleaner technology { i.e.,
when " 2 [~ "o
k; ~ "d
l]. Accounting for volume eects on total oshore and domestic production, a shift
from domestic toward cleaner oshore production overcomes the impact of additional transport
emissions when the inequality within Proposition 7 holds. This results in a decrease in globalDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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emissions. The potential for global emissions improvement due to increased foreign entry under a
border adjustment diers notably from the case with no border adjustment, where global emissions
strictly increase within incremental entry.
Further, at the emissions price threshold ~ "o = ~ "d
ko, global emissions decrease due to oshoring if
ko  ko > , but otherwise increase. Therefore, unlike the setting without border adjustment,
leakage resulting from both foreign entry and oshoring can lead to global emissions improve-
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(b) Equilibrium emissions under BAM
Figure 4 Examples of equilibrium quantities and emissions sensitivity to emissions price with border adjustment.
In Figure 4a, domestic and foreign rms operate dirty technology over interval  1, with foreign
entry decreasing over that range and domestic production constant, per Propositions 5 and 6.
At point "o
2, oshore production adopts technology 2 (at a lower emissions price than domestic
adoption, per Lemma 1). Therefore, over interval  2 oshore production utilizes cleaner technology




nd in this example), entry
increases and domestic production decreases in " over interval  2 per Propositions 5 and 6. In
 2, if
k 1
k < 1 +
1
nd, then both domestic and oshore production would decrease, but oshore
production would decline at a lesser rate. Finally, at point "d
2, domestic production also adopts
cleaner technology, and again domestic production is xed while oshore production decreases. Per
Corollary 3, total production decreases strictly in " over all intervals.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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As illustrated in Figure 4b, increases in " do not impact domestic emissions in intervals  1 and
 3 where domestic and foreign rms operate the same technology. This is a consequence of xed
domestic output over  1 and  3 as discussed above. As a result, a regulator's ability to impact
domestic emissions is limited, potentially creating challenges in meeting its emissions targets.
5.4. Discussion and summary
Unlike the setting without border adjustment, when emissions regulation is paired with border
adjustment its ability to impact global emissions and technology choice is not bounded at the
threshold where domestic rms would opt to oshore, or at any other threshold. Further, under
a border adjustment, technology choice plays a dening role in determining the nature of compe-
tition. Domestic production oshores only to adopt technology strictly cleaner than that utilized
domestically. Further, oshore production adopts clean technologies at a lower emissions price than
domestic production when it incurs a border adjustment. As a consequence, in addition to mitigat-
ing leakage, when leakage does occur (whether due to entry or oshoring), it can lead to a global
reduction in emissions. This diers markedly from the setting without border adjustment where
leakage leads to a strict increase in global emissions.
The above are clear advantages resulting from border adjustment. However, there are also poten-
tial drawbacks. While the ultimate goal of emissions regulation is to reduce global emissions, the
reality is that there can be costs associated with the failure to achieve domestic emissions targets.
Under a border adjustment, a regulator may not be able to achieve these targets directly as domes-
tic emissions are unresponsive to changes in emissions price when domestic and oshore production
utilize the same technology { i.e., when " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1). As a consequence, the domestic regulator
may become more reliant on Joint Implementation or Clean Development Mechanism allowances,
which can be subject to a long and uncertain review process. Further, foreign entry conditionally
decreases in emissions price when foreign rms operate cleaner technology than domestic rms {
when "2["o
k;"d
k) { and strictly decreases in emissions price when domestic and foreign rms operate
similar technology { when " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1). This lends credence to the anti-competitive potential ofDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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border adjustments which has thus far stymied proposals for such a mechanism. These results are
summarized below in Figure 5.
• Offshore production is cleaner than domestic 
production when                       (Lemma 1)
• Offshoring leads to the adoption of cleaner 
technology (Proposition 4) 
• Foreign firm production can decrease when     
. and strictly decreases otherwise  
. (Proposition 5)
• Domestic production decreases if.,
but is otherwise fixed (Proposition 6)
• Total output strictly decreases in
(Corollary 3)
• Emissions conditionally decrease as result of 
leakage (Proposition 7)













































Impact of Emissions Price Increase With Border Adjustment
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Figure 5 Entry and oshoring paths and results under increasing emissions price with border adjustment.
6. Implications, Conclusions and Future Research
This research explores the impact of carbon taris { i.e., border adjustments { on rms' technol-
ogy choice, regional competitiveness, and global emissions. This paper is the rst to analytically
research the impact of border adjustments when technology choice is treated as endogenous to the
setting. As such, the results here have implications for each of the primary stakeholders: regula-
tors making the policy decision regarding border adjustments; rms interested in understanding
their competitiveness and location strategies under a border adjustment; and technology producers
interested in assessing the potential impact of border adjustments on demand for cleaner technolo-
gies. Results indicate that while technology choice plays a minor role without a border adjustment,
it fundamentally denes the nature of competitiveness when border adjustments are implemented.
In border-adjusted settings where foreign rms utilize cleaner technology, increases in emissions
price favor entry, while emissions price increases favor domestic producers when rms operate
similar technologies (Propositions 5 and 6). Further, the oshoring of domestic production underDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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border adjustment only occurs when domestic rms adopt a technology cleaner than it would
utilize locally, implying that oshored production is strictly cleaner than production undertaken
domestically (Proposition 4).
The implementation of border adjustments signicantly impacts regulators' ability to inuence
both emissions and technology choice, and has important implications for regional competitiveness.
Without a border adjustment, regulators' ability to inuence rms' technology decisions as well as
global emissions is limited by the emissions price threshold at which domestic production would
oshore (Corollary 2) { a threshold that can occur at emissions prices suciently low to be of
practical concern (e.g., Boston Consulting Group 2008). Under such a circumstance (i.e., " > "o),
domestic emissions would be eliminated while global emissions increase as a consequence of carbon
leakage due to oshoring (Remark 3). The regulator can reduce domestic emissions without a border
adjustment by increasing emissions price over the interval "2["e;"o), with increased foreign entry
under such circumstances displacing domestic production while total production remains constant
(Proposition 3). However, global emissions under such conditions strictly increase (Remark 4).
Therefore, the regulator can only reduce global emissions without a border adjustment in sectors
where there is a domestic oligopoly { i.e., when " 2 (0;"e). Clearly, this limits the regulation's
ability to achieve its intent: the abatement of global emissions to mitigate the eects of climate
change.
All production serving the carbon-regulated market, whether located domestically or oshore,
incurs carbon costs under a policy that includes border adjustment. Counter to intuition, when
imported goods incur the same carbon costs as they would if produced domestically, oshore pro-
duction adopts clean technologies at lower emissions prices than domestic production (Lemma 1).
Further, domestic production adopts cleaner technology when it oshores than it would utilize
domestically (Proposition 4). As a result, carbon leakage under a border adjustment { whether due
to entry or oshoring { can lead to a reduction in global emissions rather than the strict increase
resulting from leakage without a border adjustment (Proposition 7). That said, the regulator'sDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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ability to reduce domestic emissions can be limited, as domestic production is insensitive to emis-
sions price changes when it utilizes the same technology as oshore production (Proposition 6) {
i.e., when " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1). Further, as emissions price could conditionally be employed as a lever to
reduce foreign entry under border adjustment (Propositions 5 and 6), the debate related to such a
mechanism as potentially anti-competitive is likely to continue.
6.1. Future research
Promising directions for future work include exploring the perspectives of each of the primary
stakeholders involved { capacity owners, technology producers, and the policy maker. From the
capacity owners' perspective, considering the middle-term problem would be of great interest.
Today, emissions regulation exists without border adjustment, but there is ongoing debate on the
issue, with such adjustments possible in the future. Given that uncertainty and a dynamic setting,
addressing the question of capacity pre-commitment could provide interesting insights. There is
some urgency for foreign rms to \plant their ag" and strategically commit to the regulated
market as the equilibrium number of entrants is limited. To the extent that production processes
can be decoupled into carbon intensive and nishing stages (as in the cement sector with clinker
production versus grinding/blending), this presents rms with a real option. Understanding the
value of that option and its impact on the equilibria in both markets would be an interesting
direction for further study.
From the perspective of technology producers, adoption of clean technologies is incentivized
through regulation only within the domestic market when no border adjustment is employed.
Border adjustments extend the market for clean technology to oshore production that serves the
emissions-regulated region. As a result, economies of scale and the degree of learning-by-doing
with respect to cost and performance improvements would dier between the two settings, as
would technology pricing. All of this points to important second order eects resulting from the
border adjustment decision that are worthy of further exploration. Finally, the regulator's problem
is complex, involving discontinuities with respect to global emissions, a social welfare incentiveDavid Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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to reduce global emissions and a potentially competing nancial incentive to reduce domestic
emissions. Added to the traditional challenges of managing rm prots and consumer surplus, the
challenge of targeting a single emissions price across a heterogenous set of sectors under emissions
regulation provides several facets for future study from the perspective of the policy maker.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In order to prove Proposition 1, the following Lemma must be
established:
Lemma 2. Firms will only produce with the lowest cost technology available to them, k
d for
domestic rms, and k
o for oshore rms.
Proof of Lemma 2. For domestic rm technology choice, note that ck0;l(";k)  ^ ci;k
d("; ^ d);
8k0 2Knk
d; 8l 2L by the denition of k
d. Assume that the total quantity produced at location l by







d("; ^ d)(Xi;d +
Xi;o). As a consequence, rm i minimizes its costs and maximizes prots dened in Equation (1),
by producing only with k
d.
A symmetric argument holds for oshore rms as ck0;o(";k)  ^ ci;k




Then, equilibrium quantities under free entry are required to prove Proposition 1, and are dened
by the following Lemma:












































=0; 8k 2K; 8i2Nd;







































Proof of Lemma 3. Following directly from Lemma 2, it is clear that all quantities produced
from technologies aside from a rm's preferred technology option are zero. Therefore, consider the
equilibrium resulting from quantities xi;k
d;r and yj;k
o, 8i2Nd and 8j 2No.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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=A b(Xo +Xd +Y ) byj;k
o(";k) ^ cj;k
o(";k)=0; 8j 2No: (15)
Since the problem is symmetric for all domestic rms and is likewise symmetric for all oshore

















o(";k)=0; 8j 2No:; (17)
respectively.













; 8j 2No: (18)
Substituting (18) for yj;k






























































The number of oshore entrants follows directly from its denition,
max
yj;k;8k



















o("; ^ o) ^ cj;k
o("; ^ o)yj;k
o("; ^ o)=F; 8j 2No:David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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The result follows directly by substituting (19) into the free entry solutions for xi;k
d;r("; ^ d) and
yj;k
o("; ^ o) from Lemma 3. 
Proof of joint concavity of rm objectives. The joint concavity of rm objectives can be































































Based on the FOCs given by Equations (14) and (15), it is clear that the second derivative of










= 2b; 8i2Nd; 8j 2No;
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From these second derivatives and cross partials, it is clear that the main diagonal of the Hessian
will be composed of elements equal to  2b while all other elements will be equal to  b. As a
consequence, all odd-ordered leading principle minors are strictly negative and all even-ordered
leading principle minors are positive, thereby implying strict concavity. 









Fb(nd +1)  A implies
n
o =0 by Proposition 1. Therefore yj;k =0; 8j 2No and 8k 2K. Quantities for domestic rms then















with the result following directly from standard algebra. 
Proof of Proposition 3. By denition, " > "e implies oshore and domestic rms compete
and therefore n








therefore, total oshore production Y =n
oy
j;k
























therefore total production by domestic rms Xd +Xo =ndx
i;k








Production increases in " by oshore rms when " > "e exactly oset production decreases in "
when ">"e. As a consequence, total output is xed in " when ">"e. David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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Proof of Corollary 2. By the denition of ^ ck
d("; ^ d), " > "o implies that ^ ck
d("; ^ d) =
^ ck
o("; ^ o). There are two cases to consider; the case when oshore rms have entered (i.e., " > "o
and ">"e), and the case when there is a domestic oligopoly (i.e., "2("o;"e).
CASE 1: ">"o and ">"e
By the denition of ^ ck
d("; ^ d), " > "o implies that ^ ck
d("; ^ d) = ^ ck
o("; ^ o). Therefore, conditional






























d " = 0. Therefore, the result holds
when ">"o and ">"e.
CASE 2: "2("o;"e) By the denition of ^ ck
d("; ^ d), when ">"o, ^ ck
d("; ^ d)= ^ d+ ^ d. When there














d " = 0. Therefore the result holds when
"2("o;"e). 
Proof of Lemma 1. Oshore rms prefer technology k to technology k 1 when ck;o(";k)
ck 1;o(";k 1). Under a border adjustment such that k =k", this implies that the lowest emissions







follows from the denition of ck;o(";k) and the ordering 1 <:::<m.
By a similar argument, the lowest price at which domestic rms prefer technology k to technology
k 1 is when ck;d(";k)=ck 1;d(";k 1) at ~ "d
k =
k k 1
k 1 k.David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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By assumption,  2 (0;1), i.e., oshore production has an operating and capital recovery cost
advantage. That  <1 implies ~ "o
k < ~ "d
k at emissions prices such that domestic rms produce locally
(i.e., until domestic rms adopt oshore economics at ~ "d
ko). 





















. Therefore, the lowest emissions price at which domestic pro-
duction will oshore is ~ "ojmink2Kck;d(";k)=mink2Kck;o(";k).
There are three cases to consider: when " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog and when " < "o
2 under
which conditions domestic and oshore rms operate identical technology; and when " 2 ["o
k;"d
k);





Domestic and oshore rms utilize the same technology (with domestic rms producing locally)
when " 2 ["d
k;"o




























































cannot intersect when " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog. As a
consequence, ~ "o = 2["d
k;"o
k+1); 8k 2f2;:::;kog; 8k 2f2;:::;mg.
CASE 2: "<"o
2
When " < "o
2 with a border adjustment, domestic and oshore rms both operate the dirtiest
technology 1 with domestic rms producing locally. As a consequence of arguments symmetric to





Oshore rms utilize cleaner technology than domestic rms when " 2 ["o
k;"d
k); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog.
When "2["o
k;"d




















































As a consequence of Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3, if the the domestic rm would choose to oshore
at a given emissions price { i.e., if ~ "o exists { then the domestic rm would oshore to adopt a
cleaner technology than they operate domestically. 
Proof of Proposition 5. There are two cases to consider: emissions price intervals within
which oshore rms operate cleaner technology, which occur when " 2 ["o
k;"d
k); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog;
and emissions price intervals within which domestic and oshore rms operate identical technology
that occur when "< ~ "o
2, when " ~ "d






By denition, under border adjustment, when " 2 ["o
k;"d
k); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog, oshore production
is cleaner than domestic production. When n



















CASE 2: "< ~ "o




When " < ~ "o
2, domestic and oshore rms both operate technology 1, with domestic rms pro-
ducing locally. When " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1); domestic rms operate oshore and produce under the same
economics, and therefore the same technologies, as oshore rms. Lastly, over emissions price inter-
vals such that " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog, domestic and oshore rms produce with identical
technology, with domestic rms producing locally. Under all such conditions with border adjust-
ment, when n







<0; 8k 2K: David Drake: Carbon Taris: Technology Choice, Competitiveness and Emissions
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Proof of Proposition 6. Similar to Proposition 5, there are two cases to consider: emissions
price intervals within which oshore rms operate cleaner technology that occur when "2["o
k;"d
k);
8k 2 f2;:::;kog; and emissions price intervals within which domestic and oshore rms operate
identical technology that occur when "< ~ "o
2, when " ~ "d






Under border adjustment, when "2["o
k;"d
k); 8k 2f2;:::;kog, oshore rms operate technology k
and domestic rms produce locally with technology k 1, which is strictly dirtier than technology k.
When n


















CASE 2: "< ~ "o




When " < ~ "o
2, domestic and oshore rms both operate technology 1, with domestic rms pro-
ducing locally. When " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1); domestic rms operate oshore and produce under the same
economics, and therefore the same technologies, as oshore rms. Lastly, over emissions price inter-
vals such that " 2 ["d
k;"o
k+1); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog, domestic and oshore rms produce with identical
technology, with domestic rms producing locally. Under all such conditions with border adjust-
ment, when n





=0; 8k 2K: 
Proof of Corollary 3. There are three cases to consider: a domestic oligopoly when n
o = 0;
competition between oshore and domestic rms when oshore rms operate cleaner technology,
which occurs when n
o > 0 and " 2 ["o
k;"d
k); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog; and competition between oshore and
domestic rms when both sets of rms operate the same technology, which occurs when n
o >0 and
"< ~ "o
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Under conditions where n
o = 0, domestic rms compete amongst themselves in the market. By
Corollary 1, it is clear that total production Xd +Xo +Y =ndxi;k








o >0 and "2["o
k;"d
k); 8k 2f2;:::;kog
Conditional on entry { i.e., n
o >0 { and border adjustment, when oshore rms operate cleaner
technology k and domestic rms operate technology k   1, it is evident that total production
Xd +Xo +Y =ndxi;k
d;r +n
oyj;k






















o >0 and "< ~ "o




Lastly, conditional on entry { i.e., n
o > 0 { and border adjustment, when oshore rms and

















<0; 8k 2K: 
Proof of Proposition 7. Under border adjustment and conditional on entry (i.e., n
o > 0),
Proposition 5 shows that foreign entry can only increase in " if " 2 ["o
k;"d
k); 8k 2 f2;:::;kog and
k 1
k  1 +
1
nd. Under these conditions, oshore rms operate technology k and domestic rms
produce locally with technology k  1. As a consequence, global emissions eg, which is dened in




2 +nd(k 1  k) k(k +)
is negative if  (k 1  k) < (k 1  k)
2 +
k(k+)
nd , 8k 2 f2;:::;kog but is otherwise positive.
